[strongSwan] Windows gives error 13868: Policy match error but Linux connect works

Christian Salway christian.salway at naimuri.com
Fri May 4 08:43:20 CEST 2018 

Be careful when you do the export as it exports all the other values in the same key.  You should keep just the NegotiateDH2048_AES256

The contents of the exported key should look as follows

Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RasMan\Parameters]
"NegotiateDH2048_AES256"=dword:00000002


> On 4 May 2018, at 05:53, flyingrhino <flyingrhino at orcon.net.nz> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Just to keep a complete record of this for other people who may search the list archive for this solution:
> 
> The solution was to create a windows registry key:
> Path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasman\Parameters 
> Key: NegotiateDH2048_AES256  
> Type: DWORD 32bit
> Value: 1
> 
> If you need to roll this out across multiple machines as I did - once you do the first machine, you can select the new key you just edited and do:
> File -> Export  , select type reg. 
> Then on subsequent machines the user simply double clicks the file and it gets imported automatically.
> 
> Hope this helps other people who find this post.
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, 4 May 2018 11:47:21 +1200
> flyingrhino <flyingrhino at orcon.net.nz> wrote:
> 
>> Hi Jafar and Chrisitan,
>> 
>> You guys are the best!
>> Works like a charm.
>> 
>> I decided to upgrade windows rather than degrade security. So I used the registry hack.
>> 
>> Ken
>> 
>> On Thu, 3 May 2018 14:40:56 +0100
>> Christian Salway <christian.salway at naimuri.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> or add the registry key <http://www.naimuri.com/>
>>> 
>>> HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Rasman\Parameters [DWORD 32bit] NegotiateDH2048_AES256  1
>>> 
>>> https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/Windows7#Bugs-amp-Features <https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/Windows7#Bugs-amp-Features>
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 3 May 2018, at 14:39, Jafar A-Gharaibeh <jafar at atcorp.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> The responder is configured to accept DH group modp2048 and up. Windows can only do modp1024 by default as you can see in the received proposals.
>>>> 
>>>> Append modp1024 to your strongswan ike proposals and it should work.
>>>> 
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Jafar
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 2018-05-03 04:34, flyingrhino wrote:
>>>>> Hi fellow swan'ers,
>>>>> Can anyone point me in the right direction to understand why I get the
>>>>> message "error 13868: Policy match error" when I connect using windows
>>>>> 8.1 & p12 cert to strongswan responder (5.6.2-2~local9.1 on debian
>>>>> stretch)?
>>>>> When I connect to the same responder from a linux initiator running
>>>>> linux mint 18.3 with the cert components configured manually into
>>>>> ipsec.conf , ipsec.secrets, strongswan.conf (ipsec up CONN_NAME) - it
>>>>> works perfectly!
>>>>> Here's the log from the responder with find/replace on private fields:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 02[NET] received packet: from
>>>>> 1.1.1.1[43473] to 2.2.2.2[500]
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[NET] received packet: from
>>>>> 1.1.1.1[43473] to 2.2.2.2[500] (616 bytes)
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[ENC] parsed IKE_SA_INIT request 0
>>>>> [ SA KE No N(NATD_S_IP) N(NATD_D_IP) V V V V ]
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] looking for an ike config
>>>>> for 2.2.2.2...1.1.1.1
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   candidate: 2.2.2.2...%any, prio 1052
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] found matching ike config:
>>>>> 2.2.2.2...%any with prio 1052
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] received MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY
>>>>> v9 vendor ID
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] received MS-Negotiation
>>>>> Discovery Capable vendor ID
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] received Vid-Initial-Contact vendor ID
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[ENC] received unknown vendor ID:
>>>>> 01:MORE HEX HERE:00:00:02
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] 1.1.1.1 is initiating an IKE_SA
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state
>>>>> change: CREATED => CONNECTING
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] selecting proposal:
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG]   no acceptable
>>>>> ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM found
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] received proposals:
>>>>> IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024,
>>>>> IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1024,
>>>>> IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024,
>>>>> IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/MODP_1024,
>>>>> IKE:3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024,
>>>>> IKE:AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/MODP_1024
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[CFG] configured proposals:
>>>>> IKE:AES_CBC_128/AES_CBC_192/AES_CBC_256/CAMELLIA_CBC_128/CAMELLIA_CBC_192/CAMELLIA_CBC_256/3DES_CBC/HMAC_SHA2_256_128/HMAC_SHA2_384_192/HMAC_SHA2_512_256/HMAC_SHA1_96/AES_XCBC_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512/PRF_AES128_XCBC/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/CURVE_25519/ECP_256/ECP_384/ECP_521/ECP_256_BP/ECP_384_BP/ECP_512_BP/MODP_3072/MODP_4096/MODP_6144/MODP_8192/MODP_2048,
>>>>> IKE:AES_GCM_16_128/AES_GCM_16_192/AES_GCM_16_256/AES_GCM_12_128/AES_GCM_12_192/AES_GCM_12_256/AES_GCM_8_128/AES_GCM_8_192/AES_GCM_8_256/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512/PRF_AES128_XCBC/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/CURVE_25519/ECP_256/ECP_384/ECP_521/ECP_256_BP/ECP_384_BP/ECP_512_BP/MODP_3072/MODP_4096/MODP_6144/MODP_8192/MODP_2048
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] remote host is behind NAT
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] received proposals inacceptable
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[ENC] generating IKE_SA_INIT
>>>>> response 0 [ N(NO_PROP) ]
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[NET] sending packet: from
>>>>> 2.2.2.2[500] to 1.1.1.1[43473] (36 bytes)
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 12[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state
>>>>> change: CONNECTING => DESTROYING
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 02[NET] waiting for data on sockets
>>>>> May  3 18:08:30 my_server charon: 08[NET] sending packet: from
>>>>> 2.2.2.2[500] to 1.1.1.1[
>>>>> Could it be something to do with how the client key is built - the CN,
>>>>> or san fields, or the IP addresses?
>>>>> Here's how I made the keys. Again fields have been sanitized:
>>>>> Responder
>>>>> =========
>>>>> ipsec pki --gen --type rsa --size 4096 --outform pem >
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_strongswanKey.pem
>>>>> ipsec pki --self --ca --lifetime 720 --in
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_strongswanKey.pem --type rsa --dn "C=US,
>>>>> O=company, CN=myrootCA" --outform pem >
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/my_strongswanCert.pem
>>>>> ipsec pki --gen --type rsa --size 2048 --outform pem >
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_vpnHostKey.pem
>>>>> ipsec pki --pub --in /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_vpnHostKey.pem --type rsa
>>>>> | ipsec pki --issue --lifetime 710 --cacert
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/my_strongswanCert.pem --cakey
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_strongswanKey.pem --dn "C=US, O=company,
>>>>> CN=2.2.2.2" --san 2.2.2.2 --san @2.2.2.2 --san 10.10.10.10 --san
>>>>> @10.10.10.10 --san servername --flag serverAuth --flag ikeIntermediate
>>>>> --outform pem > /etc/ipsec.d/certs/my_vpnHostCert.pem
>>>>> Initiator certs
>>>>> ===============
>>>>> ipsec pki --gen --type rsa --size 2048 --outform pem >
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_MynameKey.pem
>>>>> ipsec pki --pub --in /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_MynameKey.pem --type rsa
>>>>> | ipsec pki --issue --lifetime 710 --cacert
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/my_strongswanCert.pem --cakey
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_strongswanKey.pem --dn "C=US, O=company,
>>>>> CN=Myname at company.com" --san Myname at company.com --san Myname at 2.2.2.2
>>>>> --san Myname at 10.10.10.10 --outform pem >
>>>>> /etc/ipsec.d/certs/my_MynameCert.pem
>>>>> openssl pkcs12 -export -inkey /etc/ipsec.d/private/my_MynameKey.pem
>>>>> -in /etc/ipsec.d/certs/my_MynameCert.pem -name "my_MynameCert"
>>>>> -certfile /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/my_strongswanCert.pem -caname
>>>>> "myrootCA" -out /etc/ipsec.d/p12/my_Myname.p12
>>>>> Thanks.
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Rhinos can fly,
> 
> It's just a case of mind over matter ...
> ... And you need a lot of mind to control that much matter ...
>

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