[strongSwan] mutual TNC attestation

[Andreas Steffen]

Hi Thomas,

the basic principle of mutual attestation assumes that the peer
host has been compromised and cannot be trusted. Therefore it
doesn't make sense that device 'A' checks its IMA values against
its database, because if an attacker changes some system binaries
or libraries than he/she would also update the local database to
reflect the changed hash values. The assumption is that if
device 'A' has been compromised, device 'B' is still clean and
will be able to detect the changes on 'A' by using its untampered
database.

Best regards

Andreas

On 27.08.2015 10:12, Thomas Strobel wrote:
> Hi Andreas,
>
> thanks a lot for the documentation!
>
> Just for my understanding, for the attestation a device 'A' sends its
> IMA log to the other side 'B', and then 'B' checks the log against its
> local database? If that is the case, would it be possible that device
> 'A' checks its IMA log against its local database and then only sends
> the hash of the database and the result of the check over to 'B'? As a
> database has to be available on both sides anyway, less data would need
> to be transmitted for the attestation. I don't know if the increase in
> trusted code on each side would be acceptable, though.
>
>
> Best regards
>
> Thomas
>
>
>
> On 08/16/2015 10:41 AM, Andreas Steffen wrote:
>> Hi Thomas,
>>
>> I documented the mutual attestation between two Raspberry Pi 2
>> devices equipped with Infineon TPM 1.2 daughterboards:
>>
>> https://wiki.strongswan.org/projects/strongswan/wiki/TrustedNetworkConnect#Mutual-Attestation-of-IoT-Devices
>>
>> Best regards
>>
>> Andreas
>>
>> On 08/03/2015 08:56 PM, Thomas Strobel wrote:
>>> Hello Andreas,
>>>
>>> thank you very much for your help and the fast reply! Amazing, I'm
>>> looking forward to test it! :)
>>>
>>> Many thanks!
>>> Thomas
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08/03/2015 08:10 PM, Andreas Steffen wrote:
>>>> Hello Thomas,
>>>>
>>>> yes this is possible with strongswan 5.3.2. Have a look at my
>>>> presentation given at the 2015 TCG Members Meeting in Edinburgh:
>>>>
>>>>    https://www.strongswan.org/docs/TCG_Edinburgh_2015.pdf
>>>>
>>>> The only thing you have to do is to load the tnc-imc and tmc-imv
>>>> plugins on both the TNC client and TNC server and of course the
>>>> needed IMCs and IMVs (for attestation usually the OS and Attestation
>>>> IMC plus the Attestation IMV). In order to activated the mutual
>>>> attestation capability set the following parameter in strongswan.conf
>>>>
>>>> charon {
>>>>    plugins {
>>>>      tncss-20 {
>>>>        mutual = yes
>>>>      }
>>>>    }
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> Best regards
>>>>
>>>> Andreas
>>>>
>>>> On 03.08.2015 19:42, Thomas Strobel wrote:
>>>>> Hello everyone,
>>>>>
>>>>> being new to the mailing list, I first want to thank everyone that is or
>>>>> was involved in developing strongswan as open source project, it's
>>>>> amazing! Thanks!
>>>>>
>>>>> Now my question. I'm thinking of using strongswan to secure P2P networks
>>>>> with mutual TNC remote attestation. Does strongswan support that use
>>>>> case? I mean, is it possible that both sides act as TNC client and
>>>>> server at the same time, and that a connection is only established after
>>>>> both sides verified the integrity of the other side?
>>>>>
>>>>> Many thanks
>>>>> Thomas
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Users mailing list
>>>>> Users at lists.strongswan.org
>>>>> https://lists.strongswan.org/mailman/listinfo/users
>>>>>
>

-- 
======================================================================
Andreas Steffen                         andreas.steffen at strongswan.org
strongSwan - the Open Source VPN Solution!          www.strongswan.org
Institute for Internet Technologies and Applications
University of Applied Sciences Rapperswil
CH-8640 Rapperswil (Switzerland)
===========================================================[ITA-HSR]==

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