[strongSwan] EAP lowest common denominator

[Noel Kuntze]

Hello Volodymyr,

EAP-TLS seems to be widely supported as well. If the responder authenticates itself first, the succeeding EAP exchange is encrypted and authenticated.

Kind regards

Noel

On 02.03.2018 13:46, Volodymyr Litovka wrote:
> For example, it seems that MacOS (10.12 Sierra) native client supports only EAP-MSCHAPv2 and rejects any other methods, e.g.
>
> when I configure swanctl.conf in the following way:
>
> connections {
>     ikev2-userpass {
>       [ ... ]
>       remote-1 {
>           auth = eap-peap
>           # auth = eap-ttls
>         }
>       }
>  }
>
> I get the following messages in logs:
>
> Mar  2 14:23:32 vpn strongswan: 16[ENC] <ikev2-userpass|4> generating IKE_AUTH response 1 [ IDr CERT CERT AUTH EAP/REQ/PEAP ]
> [ ... ]
> Mar  2 14:23:32 vpn strongswan: 11[ENC] <ikev2-userpass|4> parsed IKE_AUTH request 2 [ EAP/RES/NAK ]
> Mar  2 14:23:32 vpn strongswan: 11[IKE] <ikev2-userpass|4> received EAP_NAK, sending EAP_FAILURE
>
> and same for EAP-TTLS: "generating IKE_AUTH response 1 [ IDr CERT CERT AUTH EAP/REQ/TTLS ]"receive EAP/RES/NAK
>
> So the question is there an alternative to EAP-MSCHAPv2 which can be used on mostly deployed clients?
>
> On 3/2/18 10:48 AM, Volodymyr Litovka wrote:
>> Hi colleagues,
>>
>> which, from your experience, is the lowest common denominator for EAP methods availability on various clients (hardware appliances [Cisco, Juniper, Mikrotik, etc], software clients [Windows, MacOS, iOS]), if we don't talk about EAP-MSCHAPv2 ?
>>
>> Since mschap use NTLM hash which isn't secure enough, it's not bad to store credentials in backend in a non-reversable format like SHA2. Looking at the following table - http://deployingradius.com/documents/protocols/compatibility.html - I see two possible ways to achieve this target: EAP-GTC or PAP, tunneled inside other EAP method (TTLS, PEAP, other which require only server certificate).
>>
>> So the question is - which pair of inner/outer EAP methods you will recommend to choose in order to get support for most client types and to have ability to store credentials in backend in non-reversable hash form?
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>

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