[strongSwan] no matching peer config found
rajeev nohria
rajnohria at gmail.com
Tue Oct 10 03:14:04 CEST 2017
I figured out, one of certificate was not loaded. Fixed it and working now.
On Mon, Oct 9, 2017 at 10:36 AM, rajeev nohria <rajnohria at gmail.com> wrote:
> I am using swanctl, and having "no matching peer config found" issue.
>
> Please find logs and swanctl.conf in this email.
>
> Thanks,
> Rajeev
>
> 9[NET] received packet: from fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[500] to
> 2017::5002[500] (264 bytes)
> 09[ENC] parsed IKE_SA_INIT request 0 [ SA KE No N(NATD_S_IP) N(NATD_D_IP)
> N(HASH_ALG) N(REDIR_SUP) ]
> 09[CFG] looking for an ike config for 2017::5002...fc00:cada:c402:
> 607::1001
> 09[CFG] ike config match: 3100 (2017::5002 fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 IKEv2)
> 09[CFG] candidate: 2017::5002...fc00:cada:C402:607::1001, prio 3100
> 09[CFG] found matching ike config: 2017::5002...fc00:cada:C402:607::1001
> with prio 3100
> 09[IKE] fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 is initiating an IKE_SA
> 09[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state change: CREATED => CONNECTING
> 09[CFG] selecting proposal:
> 09[CFG] proposal matches
> 09[CFG] received proposals: IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_
> 128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
> 09[CFG] configured proposals: IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_
> 128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
> 09[CFG] selected proposal: IKE:AES_CBC_128/HMAC_SHA2_256_
> 128/PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256/ECP_256
> 09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d080009c0
> 09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> M.<..X.w........
> 09[IKE] 16: 20 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 02
> .............P.
> 09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
> 09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005630
> 09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
> 5....P[.
> 09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
> 09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d080009c0
> 09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> M.<..X.w........
> 09[IKE] 16: FC 00 CA DA C4 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01
> ................
> 09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
> 09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d080056a0
> 09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
> ...|s...*.....d5
> 09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
> 09[IKE] precalculated src_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d080056a0
> 09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
> ...|s...*.....d5
> 09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
> 09[IKE] precalculated dst_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005630
> 09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
> 5....P[.
> 09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
> 09[IKE] received src_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08000eb0
> 09[IKE] 0: 89 87 B4 7C 73 09 A9 F3 2A 92 E3 A9 C6 C6 64 35
> ...|s...*.....d5
> 09[IKE] 16: 95 BC 38 0F ..8.
> 09[IKE] received dst_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08000fd0
> 09[IKE] 0: F8 0F 32 75 38 53 84 20 35 D3 D5 81 06 50 5B B1 ..2u8S.
> 5....P[.
> 09[IKE] 16: 90 95 12 4B ...K
> 09[IKE] shared Diffie Hellman secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005600
> 09[IKE] 0: 07 A8 18 F1 5B 97 39 47 DB AE 62 F1 56 DA 12 56
> ....[.9G..b.V..V
> 09[IKE] 16: 5F 5F F9 55 F4 68 94 50 AB 11 2D 5D E4 8C A8 9A
> __.U.h.P..-]....
> 09[IKE] SKEYSEED => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
> 09[IKE] 0: C0 1A C8 49 7B ED 7C AD 07 02 B7 44 48 18 B3 B3
> ...I{.|....DH...
> 09[IKE] 16: 7D 43 E0 E7 5D 58 40 B2 5D 7B 90 D5 90 BD D3 99 }C..]X@
> .]{......
> 09[IKE] Sk_d secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005600
> 09[IKE] 0: BE 08 2D 04 64 4D BB CE FC 83 DD 05 C9 D9 F0 05
> ..-.dM..........
> 09[IKE] 16: 60 EF C4 53 88 C9 82 41 54 36 00 3A AC DD 40 A9
> `..S...AT6.:.. at .
> 09[IKE] Sk_ai secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
> 09[IKE] 0: 03 03 2C 1E 63 60 16 08 B6 E3 3E BA 8C 80 AA 34
> ..,.c`....>....4
> 09[IKE] 16: A9 FA 0C 9A FF 0B A5 3C E8 2C 66 FE C6 A3 6D 85
> .......<.,f...m.
> 09[IKE] Sk_ar secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003240
> 09[IKE] 0: 58 50 F7 80 69 2E F1 BF C6 3E 27 B2 7F 51 11 D2
> XP..i....>'..Q..
> 09[IKE] 16: 79 FE 18 9B 6E C7 71 20 2B E6 EB 7F D5 A2 E3 3D y...n.q
> +......=
> 09[IKE] Sk_ei secret => 16 bytes @ 0x7f6d080017e0
> 09[IKE] 0: FC CB 72 54 A1 2B C4 31 BF 80 E6 E3 62 50 3F 34
> ..rT.+.1....bP?4
> 09[IKE] Sk_er secret => 16 bytes @ 0x7f6d080017e0
> 09[IKE] 0: F4 18 F2 91 64 3D 72 97 5C 71 06 7F A8 82 C6 41
> ....d=r.\q.....A
> 09[IKE] Sk_pi secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003ea0
> 09[IKE] 0: 9A 72 FC 50 C5 8E 55 FF EC 59 F3 AB A9 1B 71 58
> .r.P..U..Y....qX
> 09[IKE] 16: 27 76 46 AB EE 5B 64 36 9F 9A 09 52 81 82 D3 A9
> 'vF..[d6...R....
> 09[IKE] Sk_pr secret => 32 bytes @ 0x7f6d08003f70
> 09[IKE] 0: 3F A5 34 D7 4A B5 2E DB D4 F3 18 57 52 97 A8 EC
> ?.4.J......WR...
> 09[IKE] 16: 9D 87 5A 66 AE AF 18 F0 17 75 C7 67 4C 0F 39 4D
> ..Zf.....u.gL.9M
> 09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005730
> 09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 54 E5 64 60 22 20 BF A2
> M.<..X.wT.d`" ..
> 09[IKE] 16: 20 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 02
> .............P.
> 09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
> 09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005510
> 09[IKE] 0: 05 CB 8A 0D 44 85 26 3F 29 89 80 B8 35 8E ED DE
> ....D.&?)...5...
> 09[IKE] 16: D4 48 4E F0 .HN.
> 09[IKE] natd_chunk => 34 bytes @ 0x7f6d08005730
> 09[IKE] 0: 4D 98 3C 1D 83 58 E9 77 54 E5 64 60 22 20 BF A2
> M.<..X.wT.d`" ..
> 09[IKE] 16: FC 00 CA DA C4 02 06 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 01
> ................
> 09[IKE] 32: 01 F4 ..
> 09[IKE] natd_hash => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d08001960
> 09[IKE] 0: 42 0F 2B 31 CF D7 4F 9E 5C 13 63 B3 BA 38 37 6B
> B.+1..O.\.c..87k
> 09[IKE] 16: AD 69 13 A6 .i..
> 09[IKE] sending cert request for "C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01,
> CN=TEST CableLabs Device Certification Authority"
> 09[ENC] generating IKE_SA_INIT response 0 [ SA KE No N(NATD_S_IP)
> N(NATD_D_IP) CERTREQ N(HASH_ALG) N(MULT_AUTH) ]
> 09[NET] sending packet: from 2017::5002[500] to
> fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[500] (289 bytes)
> 08[NET] received packet: from fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[4500] to
> 2017::5002[4500] (1680 bytes)
> 08[ENC] parsed IKE_AUTH request 1 [ IDi CERT CERTREQ AUTH N(USE_TRANSP) SA
> TSi TSr N(MOBIKE_SUP) N(NO_ADD_ADDR) N(MULT_AUTH) N(EAP_ONLY) ]
> 08[IKE] received cert request for "C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01,
> CN=TEST CableLabs Device Certification Authority"
> 08[IKE] received cert request for unknown ca with keyid
> bd:0e:4c:0f:21:cf:f0:49:af:19:34:3b:c2:64:c5:31:a1:2e:11:07
> 08[IKE] received 1 cert requests for an unknown ca
> 08[ASN] L0 - x509:
> 08[ASN] => 1016 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003df0
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 82 03 F4 30 82 02 5C A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00
> 0...0..\........
> 08[ASN] 16: DD DC 09 21 36 F2 E8 71 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86
> ...!6..q0...*.H.
> 08[ASN] 32: F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55
> .......0t1.0...U
> 08[ASN] 48: 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13
> ....US1.0...U...
> 08[ASN] 64: 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03
> .CableLabs1.0...
> 08[ASN] 80: 55 04 0B 13 10 54 45 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 U....TEST
> Device
> 08[ASN] 96: 20 43 41 30 31 31 36 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D
> CA011604..U...-
> 08[ASN] 112: 54 45 53 54 20 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 TEST
> CableLabs D
> 08[ASN] 128: 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 evice
> Certificat
> 08[ASN] 144: 69 6F 6E 20 41 75 74 68 6F 72 69 74 79 30 1E 17 ion
> Authority0..
> 08[ASN] 160: 0D 31 37 30 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 17 0D
> .170928181853Z..
> 08[ASN] 176: 33 37 30 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 30 4A 31
> 370928181853Z0J1
> 08[ASN] 192: 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0E 30 0C
> .0...U....US1.0.
> 08[ASN] 208: 06 03 55 04 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31 0F 30 0D
> ..U....ARRIS1.0.
> 08[ASN] 224: 06 03 55 04 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C 31 1A 30
> ..U....LOWELL1.0
> 08[ASN] 240: 18 06 03 55 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33 3A 35 66
> ...U....00:33:5f
> 08[ASN] 256: 3A 61 62 3A 38 63 3A 39 65 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06
> :ab:8c:9e0.."0..
> 08[ASN] 272: 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0F
> .*.H............
> 08[ASN] 288: 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1
> .0.........?`.d.
> 08[ASN] 304: 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7
> O.....f..m]c....
> 08[ASN] 320: 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14
> d....[.)..V.....
> 08[ASN] 336: C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17
> .qB.g..I.4...eD.
> 08[ASN] 352: E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21
> ...S..._...tZ..!
> 08[ASN] 368: 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02
> ./.......W.r.L..
> 08[ASN] 384: 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F
> YL.KLk........j?
> 08[ASN] 400: A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6
> ...G..R..lf...|.
> 08[ASN] 416: 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08
> ...*~h.....}K.8.
> 08[ASN] 432: 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04
> ....c.\.Y=....=.
> 08[ASN] 448: 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0
> e.V.......$.....
> 08[ASN] 464: 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06
> z^....01........
> 08[ASN] 480: CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45
> ...bAws..:..l..E
> 08[ASN] 496: EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4
> ...Q...`......Z.
> 08[ASN] 512: 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C
> ...p...]...T.f.,
> 08[ASN] 528: 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B
> ....9...1.3...z.
> 08[ASN] 544: DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 A3 ..,..3".
> .......
> 08[ASN] 560: 33 30 31 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03
> 3010...U........
> 08[ASN] 576: 02 05 A0 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14
> ...0...U.#..0...
> 08[ASN] 592: F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F
> .. at ...{z..x.J(z.
> 08[ASN] 608: 57 9B F9 9B 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
> W...0...*.H.....
> 08[ASN] 624: 0B 05 00 03 82 01 81 00 54 17 44 39 3D 12 4C E8
> ........T.D9=.L.
> 08[ASN] 640: AB 84 9F D3 0E 6C CA 73 18 6B CD D0 B7 E7 6C E5
> .....l.s.k....l.
> 08[ASN] 656: B2 C0 40 77 62 1A 42 45 60 81 9E 9F D4 0C 6F FE
> .. at wb.BE`.....o.
> 08[ASN] 672: 20 75 31 CF AF 55 29 13 3B E3 62 F4 70 B2 25 55
> u1..U).;.b.p.%U
> 08[ASN] 688: 11 41 F2 1C D9 8D 50 ED 13 DF 76 62 B7 DE A3 15
> .A....P...vb....
> 08[ASN] 704: 55 BD 6C EC 0F 7A 96 33 CA 29 CC A1 C7 30 AE 19
> U.l..z.3.)...0..
> 08[ASN] 720: 34 42 C8 28 24 50 51 E0 A3 4A 6A 52 C9 F1 27 C3
> 4B.($PQ..JjR..'.
> 08[ASN] 736: A5 C0 7C 0D 61 8B E7 A0 94 25 D6 53 BB 01 DB EB
> ..|.a....%.S....
> 08[ASN] 752: 42 BF 24 96 54 BD D8 A8 44 43 47 DE E6 0C 7C C6
> B.$.T...DCG...|.
> 08[ASN] 768: DE 62 F5 3D 52 20 A6 F9 EB 93 65 4E 4C AD 29 37 .b.=R
> ....eNL.)7
> 08[ASN] 784: 96 B7 FD 6B 0F D6 49 5D 4D C3 E4 D5 7C DC C9 DB
> ...k..I]M...|...
> 08[ASN] 800: 7E 86 2A 72 76 06 AA BF 13 5D 3E B1 73 D5 AE CB
> ~.*rv....]>.s...
> 08[ASN] 816: 46 3F E4 F1 B7 25 BF DA 87 E9 AE E7 10 45 9B 7E
> F?...%.......E.~
> 08[ASN] 832: F3 3C 2A 5F 81 D4 0B A7 22 D6 A6 4C 49 1F 2B 78
> .<*_...."..LI.+x
> 08[ASN] 848: EA BF DF 2E 74 B8 70 BD 89 74 C2 65 03 7F 60 E3
> ....t.p..t.e..`.
> 08[ASN] 864: 1D 0F 3E 23 AB 2F 7B 32 09 68 DD DE 9D D6 FC 9F
> ..>#./{2.h......
> 08[ASN] 880: 58 7A 5C 36 FF 01 25 9E 66 A6 F4 F5 F6 A0 04 5A
> Xz\6..%.f......Z
> 08[ASN] 896: DA F4 A1 CB 88 BE A4 67 41 95 17 F2 9E 10 50 60
> .......gA.....P`
> 08[ASN] 912: 32 B3 A1 7E A3 DB E2 C3 0D 5E 65 03 E7 06 1A B7
> 2..~.....^e.....
> 08[ASN] 928: 55 82 73 D8 98 5C A5 32 A3 36 2C C8 2E 61 CA 61
> U.s..\.2.6,..a.a
> 08[ASN] 944: 79 48 87 C4 10 43 2F 43 AE 99 AF E1 81 80 AE 23
> yH...C/C.......#
> 08[ASN] 960: 60 3F A8 E4 1E BD 22 51 86 99 34 4E 97 99 7D 40
> `?...."Q..4N..}@
> 08[ASN] 976: 8B 4B 91 48 F2 8B 8A A1 BF 34 56 DA 0A 32 67 8D
> .K.H.....4V..2g.
> 08[ASN] 992: B3 28 AB D7 24 7C 78 AA 0A 56 91 E0 67 E3 11 9B
> .(..$|x..V..g...
> 08[ASN] 1008: 30 71 0C 78 59 D2 26 30 0q.xY.&0
> 08[ASN] L1 - tbsCertificate:
> 08[ASN] => 608 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003df4
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 82 02 5C A0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 DD DC 09 21
> 0..\...........!
> 08[ASN] 16: 36 F2 E8 71 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01
> 6..q0...*.H.....
> 08[ASN] 32: 0B 05 00 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02
> ...0t1.0...U....
> 08[ASN] 48: 55 53 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13 09 43 61 62
> US1.0...U....Cab
> 08[ASN] 64: 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0B 13
> leLabs1.0...U...
> 08[ASN] 80: 10 54 45 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 41 30 .TEST
> Device CA0
> 08[ASN] 96: 31 31 36 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D 54 45 53 54
> 11604..U...-TEST
> 08[ASN] 112: 20 43 61 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 65 76 69 63 CableLabs
> Devic
> 08[ASN] 128: 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 e
> Certification
> 08[ASN] 144: 41 75 74 68 6F 72 69 74 79 30 1E 17 0D 31 37 30
> Authority0...170
> 08[ASN] 160: 39 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 17 0D 33 37 30 39
> 928181853Z..3709
> 08[ASN] 176: 32 38 31 38 31 38 35 33 5A 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06
> 28181853Z0J1.0..
> 08[ASN] 192: 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0E 30 0C 06 03 55 04
> .U....US1.0...U.
> 08[ASN] 208: 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04
> ...ARRIS1.0...U.
> 08[ASN] 224: 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55
> ...LOWELL1.0...U
> 08[ASN] 240: 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33 3A 35 66 3A 61 62 3A
> ....00:33:5f:ab:
> 08[ASN] 256: 38 63 3A 39 65 30 82 01 22 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48
> 8c:9e0.."0...*.H
> 08[ASN] 272: 86 F7 0D 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0F 00 30 82 01
> .............0..
> 08[ASN] 288: 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F 8F 83 F5
> .......?`.d.O...
> 08[ASN] 304: D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64 BD 8F F5
> ..f..m]c....d...
> 08[ASN] 320: BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0 71 42 B8
> .[.)..V......qB.
> 08[ASN] 336: 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4 B3 E1 53
> g..I.4...eD....S
> 08[ASN] 352: C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90 2F C7 98
> ..._...tZ..!./..
> 08[ASN] 368: 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59 4C E0 4B
> .....W.r.L..YL.K
> 08[ASN] 384: 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5 D3 A7 47
> Lk........j?...G
> 08[ASN] 400: DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08 D8 89 2A
> ..R..lf...|....*
> 08[ASN] 416: 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11 9C B6 AC
> ~h.....}K.8.....
> 08[ASN] 432: 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65 07 56 C8
> c.\.Y=....=.e.V.
> 08[ASN] 448: A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A 5E CB DA
> ......$.....z^..
> 08[ASN] 464: E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE 0C C4 62
> ..01...........b
> 08[ASN] 480: 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB EF C0 51
> Aws..:..l..E...Q
> 08[ASN] 496: F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C FB 81 70
> ...`......Z....p
> 08[ASN] 512: DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18 A4 0E 05
> ...]...T.f.,....
> 08[ASN] 528: 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB F2 2C CD
> 9...1.3...z...,.
> 08[ASN] 544: F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 A3 33 30 31 30 .3".
> .......3010
> 08[ASN] 560: 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 05 A0 30
> ...U...........0
> 08[ASN] 576: 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 F6 DC 40 8A
> ...U.#..0..... at .
> 08[ASN] 592: 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F 57 9B F9 9B
> ..{z..x.J(z.W...
> 08[ASN] L2 - DEFAULT v1:
> 08[ASN] L3 - version:
> 08[ASN] => 1 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003dfc
> 08[ASN] 0: 02 .
> 08[ASN] X.509v3
> 08[ASN] L2 - serialNumber:
> 08[ASN] => 9 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003dff
> 08[ASN] 0: 00 DD DC 09 21 36 F2 E8 71 ....!6..q
> 08[ASN] L2 - signature:
> 08[ASN] L3 - algorithmIdentifier:
> 08[ASN] L4 - algorithm:
> 08[ASN] 'sha256WithRSAEncryption'
> 08[ASN] L2 - issuer:
> 08[ASN] => 118 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003e17
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 74 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
> 0t1.0...U....US1
> 08[ASN] 16: 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 0A 13 09 43 61 62 6C 65 4C
> .0...U....CableL
> 08[ASN] 32: 61 62 73 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0B 13 10 54 45
> abs1.0...U....TE
> 08[ASN] 48: 53 54 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 41 30 31 31 36 ST Device
> CA0116
> 08[ASN] 64: 30 34 06 03 55 04 03 13 2D 54 45 53 54 20 43 61
> 04..U...-TEST Ca
> 08[ASN] 80: 62 6C 65 4C 61 62 73 20 44 65 76 69 63 65 20 43 bleLabs
> Device C
> 08[ASN] 96: 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 20 41 75 74
> ertification Aut
> 08[ASN] 112: 68 6F 72 69 74 79 hority
> 08[ASN] 'C=US, O=CableLabs, OU=TEST Device CA01, CN=TEST CableLabs
> Device Certification Authority'
> 08[ASN] L2 - validity:
> 08[ASN] L3 - notBefore:
> 08[ASN] L4 - utcTime:
> 08[ASN] 'Sep 28 18:18:53 UTC 2017'
> 08[ASN] L3 - notAfter:
> 08[ASN] L4 - utcTime:
> 08[ASN] 'Sep 28 18:18:53 UTC 2037'
> 08[ASN] L2 - subject:
> 08[ASN] => 76 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003ead
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 4A 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31
> 0J1.0...U....US1
> 08[ASN] 16: 0E 30 0C 06 03 55 04 0A 13 05 41 52 52 49 53 31
> .0...U....ARRIS1
> 08[ASN] 32: 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 0B 13 06 4C 4F 57 45 4C 4C
> .0...U....LOWELL
> 08[ASN] 48: 31 1A 30 18 06 03 55 04 03 13 11 30 30 3A 33 33
> 1.0...U....00:33
> 08[ASN] 64: 3A 35 66 3A 61 62 3A 38 63 3A 39 65 :5f:ab:8c:9e
> 08[ASN] 'C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL, CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e'
> 08[ASN] L2 - subjectPublicKeyInfo:
> 08[ASN] -- > --
> 08[ASN] L0 - subjectPublicKeyInfo:
> 08[ASN] L1 - algorithm:
> 08[ASN] L2 - algorithmIdentifier:
> 08[ASN] L3 - algorithm:
> 08[ASN] 'rsaEncryption'
> 08[ASN] L1 - subjectPublicKey:
> 08[ASN] => 271 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f10
> 08[ASN] 0: 00 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1
> .0.........?`.d.
> 08[ASN] 16: 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7
> O.....f..m]c....
> 08[ASN] 32: 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14
> d....[.)..V.....
> 08[ASN] 48: C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17
> .qB.g..I.4...eD.
> 08[ASN] 64: E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21
> ...S..._...tZ..!
> 08[ASN] 80: 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02
> ./.......W.r.L..
> 08[ASN] 96: 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F
> YL.KLk........j?
> 08[ASN] 112: A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6
> ...G..R..lf...|.
> 08[ASN] 128: 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08
> ...*~h.....}K.8.
> 08[ASN] 144: 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04
> ....c.\.Y=....=.
> 08[ASN] 160: 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0
> e.V.......$.....
> 08[ASN] 176: 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06
> z^....01........
> 08[ASN] 192: CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45
> ...bAws..:..l..E
> 08[ASN] 208: EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4
> ...Q...`......Z.
> 08[ASN] 224: 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C
> ...p...]...T.f.,
> 08[ASN] 240: 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B
> ....9...1.3...z.
> 08[ASN] 256: DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 ..,..3".
> ......
> 08[ASN] -- > --
> 08[ASN] L0 - RSAPublicKey:
> 08[ASN] => 270 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f11
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F
> 0.........?`.d.O
> 08[ASN] 16: 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64
> .....f..m]c....d
> 08[ASN] 32: BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0 FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0
> ....[.)..V......
> 08[ASN] 48: 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4
> qB.g..I.4...eD..
> 08[ASN] 64: B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90
> ..S..._...tZ..!.
> 08[ASN] 80: 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59
> /.......W.r.L..Y
> 08[ASN] 96: 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5
> L.KLk........j?.
> 08[ASN] 112: D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08
> ..G..R..lf...|..
> 08[ASN] 128: D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5 CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11
> ..*~h.....}K.8..
> 08[ASN] 144: 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65
> ...c.\.Y=....=.e
> 08[ASN] 160: 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02 ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A
> .V.......$.....z
> 08[ASN] 176: 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE
> ^....01.........
> 08[ASN] 192: 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB
> ..bAws..:..l..E.
> 08[ASN] 208: EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C
> ..Q...`......Z..
> 08[ASN] 224: FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7 FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18
> ..p...]...T.f.,.
> 08[ASN] 240: A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB
> ...9...1.3...z..
> 08[ASN] 256: F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20 83 02 03 01 00 01 .,..3".
> ......
> 08[ASN] L1 - modulus:
> 08[ASN] => 257 bytes @ 0x7f6d14003f19
> 08[ASN] 0: 00 CB 3F 60 9D 64 D1 4F 8F 83 F5 D5 FB 66 99 2E
> ..?`.d.O.....f..
> 08[ASN] 16: 6D 5D 63 9A 1F B0 A7 64 BD 8F F5 BD 5B 0F 29 A0
> m]c....d....[.).
> 08[ASN] 32: FB 56 C8 BA FB E2 14 C0 71 42 B8 67 EA B1 49 A4
> .V......qB.g..I.
> 08[ASN] 48: 34 8C FC B8 65 44 17 E4 B3 E1 53 C5 C4 FD 5F 0D
> 4...eD....S..._.
> 08[ASN] 64: 18 A8 74 5A 8B C7 21 90 2F C7 98 17 CD 84 B4 B7
> ..tZ..!./.......
> 08[ASN] 80: 57 1B 72 11 4C F0 02 59 4C E0 4B 4C 6B 92 D0 90
> W.r.L..YL.KLk...
> 08[ASN] 96: 2E C7 9B 9E E9 6A 3F A5 D3 A7 47 DC 08 52 E6 C1
> .....j?...G..R..
> 08[ASN] 112: 6C 66 A4 BC C2 7C A6 08 D8 89 2A 7E 68 E1 10 F5
> lf...|....*~h...
> 08[ASN] 128: CC DA 7D 4B E1 38 08 11 9C B6 AC 63 1F 5C B0 59
> ..}K.8.....c.\.Y
> 08[ASN] 144: 3D C4 99 82 11 3D 04 65 07 56 C8 A0 1B 87 CF 02
> =....=.e.V......
> 08[ASN] 160: ED 24 BC 94 05 C2 E0 7A 5E CB DA E4 89 30 31 BB
> .$.....z^....01.
> 08[ASN] 176: A6 EF 0C BF 90 B1 06 CE 0C C4 62 41 77 73 96 EA
> ..........bAws..
> 08[ASN] 192: 3A F7 D6 6C 0B 8C 45 EB EF C0 51 F6 D4 14 60 10
> :..l..E...Q...`.
> 08[ASN] 208: 18 0E D3 82 CB 5A D4 0C FB 81 70 DA 15 F2 5D D7
> .....Z....p...].
> 08[ASN] 224: FF E9 54 AE 66 92 2C 18 A4 0E 05 39 F0 C4 FF 31
> ..T.f.,....9...1
> 08[ASN] 240: 81 33 9D 90 18 7A 0B DB F2 2C CD F2 33 22 BF 20
> .3...z...,..3".
> 08[ASN] 256: 83 .
> 08[ASN] L1 - publicExponent:
> 08[ASN] => 3 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400401c
> 08[ASN] 0: 01 00 01 ...
> 08[ASN] -- < --
> 08[ASN] -- < --
> 08[ASN] L2 - optional extensions:
> 08[ASN] L3 - extensions:
> 08[ASN] L4 - extension:
> 08[ASN] L5 - extnID:
> 08[ASN] 'keyUsage'
> 08[ASN] L5 - critical:
> 08[ASN] => 1 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400402c
> 08[ASN] 0: FF .
> 08[ASN] TRUE
> 08[ASN] L5 - extnValue:
> 08[ASN] => 4 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400402f
> 08[ASN] 0: 03 02 05 A0 ....
> 08[ASN] L4 - extension:
> 08[ASN] L5 - extnID:
> 08[ASN] 'authorityKeyIdentifier'
> 08[ASN] L5 - critical:
> 08[ASN] FALSE
> 08[ASN] L5 - extnValue:
> 08[ASN] => 24 bytes @ 0x7f6d1400403c
> 08[ASN] 0: 30 16 80 14 F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 0.....@
> ...{z..x.
> 08[ASN] 16: 4A 28 7A 7F 57 9B F9 9B J(z.W...
> 08[ASN] L6 - authorityKeyIdentifier:
> 08[ASN] L7 - keyIdentifier:
> 08[ASN] => 20 bytes @ 0x7f6d14004040
> 08[ASN] 0: F6 DC 40 8A 89 B6 7B 7A 08 F6 78 B5 4A 28 7A 7F
> .. at ...{z..x.J(z.
> 08[ASN] 16: 57 9B F9 9B W...
> 08[ASN] L1 - signatureAlgorithm:
> 08[ASN] L2 - algorithmIdentifier:
> 08[ASN] L3 - algorithm:
> 08[ASN] 'sha256WithRSAEncryption'
> 08[ASN] L1 - signatureValue:
> 08[ASN] => 385 bytes @ 0x7f6d14004067
> 08[ASN] 0: 00 54 17 44 39 3D 12 4C E8 AB 84 9F D3 0E 6C CA
> .T.D9=.L......l.
> 08[ASN] 16: 73 18 6B CD D0 B7 E7 6C E5 B2 C0 40 77 62 1A 42
> s.k....l... at wb.B
> 08[ASN] 32: 45 60 81 9E 9F D4 0C 6F FE 20 75 31 CF AF 55 29 E`.....o.
> u1..U)
> 08[ASN] 48: 13 3B E3 62 F4 70 B2 25 55 11 41 F2 1C D9 8D 50
> .;.b.p.%U.A....P
> 08[ASN] 64: ED 13 DF 76 62 B7 DE A3 15 55 BD 6C EC 0F 7A 96
> ...vb....U.l..z.
> 08[ASN] 80: 33 CA 29 CC A1 C7 30 AE 19 34 42 C8 28 24 50 51
> 3.)...0..4B.($PQ
> 08[ASN] 96: E0 A3 4A 6A 52 C9 F1 27 C3 A5 C0 7C 0D 61 8B E7
> ..JjR..'...|.a..
> 08[ASN] 112: A0 94 25 D6 53 BB 01 DB EB 42 BF 24 96 54 BD D8
> ..%.S....B.$.T..
> 08[ASN] 128: A8 44 43 47 DE E6 0C 7C C6 DE 62 F5 3D 52 20 A6
> .DCG...|..b.=R .
> 08[ASN] 144: F9 EB 93 65 4E 4C AD 29 37 96 B7 FD 6B 0F D6 49
> ...eNL.)7...k..I
> 08[ASN] 160: 5D 4D C3 E4 D5 7C DC C9 DB 7E 86 2A 72 76 06 AA
> ]M...|...~.*rv..
> 08[ASN] 176: BF 13 5D 3E B1 73 D5 AE CB 46 3F E4 F1 B7 25 BF
> ..]>.s...F?...%.
> 08[ASN] 192: DA 87 E9 AE E7 10 45 9B 7E F3 3C 2A 5F 81 D4 0B
> ......E.~.<*_...
> 08[ASN] 208: A7 22 D6 A6 4C 49 1F 2B 78 EA BF DF 2E 74 B8 70
> ."..LI.+x....t.p
> 08[ASN] 224: BD 89 74 C2 65 03 7F 60 E3 1D 0F 3E 23 AB 2F 7B
> ..t.e..`...>#./{
> 08[ASN] 240: 32 09 68 DD DE 9D D6 FC 9F 58 7A 5C 36 FF 01 25
> 2.h......Xz\6..%
> 08[ASN] 256: 9E 66 A6 F4 F5 F6 A0 04 5A DA F4 A1 CB 88 BE A4
> .f......Z.......
> 08[ASN] 272: 67 41 95 17 F2 9E 10 50 60 32 B3 A1 7E A3 DB E2
> gA.....P`2..~...
> 08[ASN] 288: C3 0D 5E 65 03 E7 06 1A B7 55 82 73 D8 98 5C A5
> ..^e.....U.s..\.
> 08[ASN] 304: 32 A3 36 2C C8 2E 61 CA 61 79 48 87 C4 10 43 2F
> 2.6,..a.ayH...C/
> 08[ASN] 320: 43 AE 99 AF E1 81 80 AE 23 60 3F A8 E4 1E BD 22
> C.......#`?...."
> 08[ASN] 336: 51 86 99 34 4E 97 99 7D 40 8B 4B 91 48 F2 8B 8A Q..4N..}@
> .K.H...
> 08[ASN] 352: A1 BF 34 56 DA 0A 32 67 8D B3 28 AB D7 24 7C 78
> ..4V..2g..(..$|x
> 08[ASN] 368: AA 0A 56 91 E0 67 E3 11 9B 30 71 0C 78 59 D2 26
> ..V..g...0q.xY.&
> 08[ASN] 384: 30 0
> 08[IKE] received end entity cert "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL,
> CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e"
> 08[CFG] looking for peer configs matching 2017::5002[%any]...fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[C=US,
> O=ARRIS, OU=LOWELL, CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e]
> 08[CFG] peer config match local: 1 (ID_ANY -> )
> 08[CFG] peer config match remote: 0 (ID_DER_ASN1_DN ->
> 30:4a:31:0b:30:09:06:03:55:04:06:13:02:55:53:31:0e:30:0c:06:
> 03:55:04:0a:13:05:41:52:52:49:53:31:0f:30:0d:06:03:55:04:0b:
> 13:06:4c:4f:57:45:4c:4c:31:1a:30:18:06:03:55:04:03:13:11:30:
> 30:3a:33:33:3a:35:66:3a:61:62:3a:38:63:3a:39:65)
> 08[CFG] ike config match: 3100 (2017::5002 fc00:cada:c402:607::1001 IKEv2)
> 08[CFG] no matching peer config found
> 08[IKE] peer supports MOBIKE
> 08[ENC] generating IKE_AUTH response 1 [ N(AUTH_FAILED) ]
> 08[NET] sending packet: from 2017::5002[4500] to
> fc00:cada:c402:607::1001[4500] (80 bytes)
> 08[IKE] IKE_SA (unnamed)[2] state change: CONNECTING => DESTROYING
>
>
>
>
>
>
> swanctl.conf
>
>
> # Section defining IKE connection configurations.
> connections {
>
> # Section for an IKE connection named <conn>.
> rw{
>
> # IKE major version to use for connection.
> version = 2
>
> # Local address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
> local_addrs = 2017::5002
> #local_addrs = 10.13.199.130
> #local_addrs = 10.185.44.187
>
> # Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
> remote_addrs = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001
> #remote_addrs = 10.13.199.174
> #remote_addrs = 10.14.37.97
>
>
> # Local UDP port for IKE communication.
> # local_port = 500
>
> # Remote UDP port for IKE communication.
> # remote_port = 500
>
> # Comma separated proposals to accept for IKE.
> proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
>
> # Virtual IPs to request in configuration payload / Mode Config.
> # vips =
>
> # Use Aggressive Mode in IKEv1.
> # aggressive = no
>
> # Set the Mode Config mode to use.
> # pull = yes
>
> # Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.
> # encap = no
>
> # Enables MOBIKE on IKEv2 connections.
> # mobike = yes
>
> # Interval of liveness checks (DPD).
> # dpd_delay = 0s
>
> # Timeout for DPD checks (IKEV1 only).
> # dpd_timeout = 0s
>
> # Use IKE UDP datagram fragmentation. (yes, no or force).
> # fragmentation = no
>
> # Send certificate requests payloads (yes or no).
> # send_certreq = yes
>
> # Send certificate payloads (always, never or ifasked).
> # send_cert = ifasked
>
> # Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial
> connect.
> # keyingtries = 1
>
> # Connection uniqueness policy (never, no, keep or replace).
> # unique = no
>
> # Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.
> # reauth_time = 0s
>
> # Time to schedule IKE rekeying.
> # rekey_time = 4h
>
> # Hard IKE_SA lifetime if rekey/reauth does not complete, as time.
> # over_time = 10% of rekey_time/reauth_time
>
> # Range of random time to subtract from rekey/reauth times.
> # rand_time = over_time
>
> # Comma separated list of named IP pools.
> # pools =
>
> # Section for a local authentication round.
> local {
>
> # Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds
> are
> # sorted. If not specified rounds are ordered by their
> position in
> # the config file/VICI message.
> # round = 0
>
> # Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for
> # authentication.
> certs = device.crt
>
> # Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for
> # authentication.
> #pubkeys =
>
> # Authentication to perform locally (pubkey, psk,
> xauth[-backend] or
> # eap[-method]).
> auth = pubkey
>
> # IKE identity to use for authentication round.
> id = "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=Lowell, CN=00:0c:29:9d:7d:92"
> #id = "C=US, ST=MA, O=Arris, CN=StrongSwan Root CA"
> #id = 10.13.199.130
> #id = 10.185.44.187
>
> # Client EAP-Identity to use in EAP-Identity exchange and the
> EAP
> # method.
> # eap_id = id
>
> # Server side EAP-Identity to expect in the EAP method.
> # aaa_id = remote-id
>
> # Client XAuth username used in the XAuth exchange.
> # xauth_id = id
>
> }
>
> # Section for a remote authentication round.
> remote {
>
> # Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds
> are
> # sorted. If not specified rounds are ordered by their
> position in
> # the config file/VICI message.
> # round = 0
>
> # IKE identity to expect for authentication round.
> id = fc00:cada:c402:607::1001
> #id = "C=US, O=ARRIS, OU=Lowell, CN=00:33:5f:ab:8c:9e"
> #id = 10.13.199.174
> #id = 10.14.37.97
>
> # Authorization group memberships to require.
> # groups =
>
> # Comma separated list of certificate to accept for
> authentication.
> # certs =
>
> # Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for
> # authentication.
> # cacerts = deviceCa.crt
> # Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for
> # authentication.
> # pubkeys =
>
> # Certificate revocation policy, (strict, ifuri or relaxed).
> # revocation = relaxed
>
> # Authentication to expect from remote (pubkey, psk,
> xauth[-backend]
> # or eap[-method]).
> auth = pubkey
> }
>
> children {
>
> # CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
> gcp {
>
> # AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
> # ah_proposals =
>
> # ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
> esp_proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
>
> # Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
> local_ts = 2017::5002[tcp]
>
> # Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
> remote_ts = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001[tcp]
>
> # Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
> # rekey_time = 1h
>
> # Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
> # life_time = rekey_time + 10%
>
> # Range of random time to subtract from rekey_time.
> # rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
>
> # Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA
> rekeying.
> # rekey_bytes = 0
>
> # Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
> # life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
>
> # Range of random bytes to subtract from rekey_bytes.
> # rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
>
> # Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA
> # rekeying.
> # rekey_packets = 0
>
> # Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets
> # closed.
> # life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
>
> # Range of random packets to subtract from packets_bytes.
> # rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
>
> # Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
> #updown = abcd
>
> # Hostaccess variable to pass to updown script.
> # hostaccess = yes
>
> # IPsec Mode to establish (tunnel, transport, beet, pass or
> # drop).
> mode = transport
>
> # Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
> # policies = yes
>
> # Action to perform on DPD timeout (clear, trap or
> restart).
> # dpd_action = clear
>
> # Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
> # ipcomp = no
>
> # Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
> # inactivity = 0s
>
> # Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
> # reqid = 0
>
> # Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
> # mark_in = 0/0x00000000
>
> # Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
> # mark_out = 0/0x00000000
>
> # Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
> # tfc_padding = 0
>
> # IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.
> # replay_window = 32
>
> # Action to perform after loading the configuration (none,
> trap,
> # start).
> # start_action = none
>
> # Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (none,
> trap,
> # start).
> # close_action = none
>
> }
>
>
> l2tp {
>
> # AH proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
> # ah_proposals =
>
> # ESP proposals to offer for the CHILD_SA.
> esp_proposals = aes128-sha256-ecp256
>
> # Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
> local_ts = 2017::5002[115]
>
> # Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
> remote_ts = fc00:cada:C402:607::1001[115]
>
> # Time to schedule CHILD_SA rekeying.
> # rekey_time = 1h
>
> # Maximum lifetime before CHILD_SA gets closed, as time.
> # life_time = rekey_time + 10%
>
> # Range of random time to subtract from rekey_time.
> # rand_time = life_time - rekey_time
>
> # Number of bytes processed before initiating CHILD_SA
> rekeying.
> # rekey_bytes = 0
>
> # Maximum bytes processed before CHILD_SA gets closed.
> # life_bytes = rekey_bytes + 10%
>
> # Range of random bytes to subtract from rekey_bytes.
> # rand_bytes = life_bytes - rekey_bytes
>
> # Number of packets processed before initiating CHILD_SA
> # rekeying.
> # rekey_packets = 0
>
> # Maximum number of packets processed before CHILD_SA gets
> # closed.
> # life_packets = rekey_packets + 10%
>
> # Range of random packets to subtract from packets_bytes.
> # rand_packets = life_packets - rekey_packets
>
> # Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
> #updown = abcd
>
> # Hostaccess variable to pass to updown script.
> # hostaccess = yes
>
> # IPsec Mode to establish (tunnel, transport, beet, pass or
> # drop).
> mode = transport
>
> # Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
> policies = yes
>
> # Action to perform on DPD timeout (clear, trap or
> restart).
> # dpd_action = clear
>
> # Enable IPComp compression before encryption.
> # ipcomp = no
>
> # Timeout before closing CHILD_SA after inactivity.
> # inactivity = 0s
>
> # Fixed reqid to use for this CHILD_SA.
> # reqid = 0
>
> # Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
> # mark_in = 0/0x00000000
>
> # Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
> # mark_out = 0/0x00000000
>
> # Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
> # tfc_padding = 0
>
> # IPsec replay window to configure for this CHILD_SA.
> # replay_window = 32
>
> # Action to perform after loading the configuration (none,
> trap,
> # start).
> # start_action = none
>
> # Action to perform after a CHILD_SA gets closed (none,
> trap,
> # start).
> # close_action = none
>
> }
>
>
> }
>
> }
>
> }
>
>
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